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form of electronic communication, internal or

been increasing at an ever-accel-

external, to survive in a truly wired business

erating rate. Communication via the Internet

environment.

and World Wide Web continues to grow geo-

These profound changes in communication

metrically, with estimates projecting that

and data exchange increasingly present issues

approximately 40 million Americans 1 will

in litigation.

send over 60 billion e-mail messages during

unexpected proliferation of e-mail in recent

the year 2000.2 As of the turn of the millen-

years, courts have faced many difficult ques-

nium, one calculation predicted that some one

tions.

3
billion people worldwide would be online.

development of a jurisprudence governing elec-

This enormous growth is reflected among both

tronic mail, courts and attorneys have had little

consumers and businesses, as organizations of

guidance in deciding difficult questions of law,

virtually all sizes are forced to utilize some

4
conducting litigation, and advising clients.

Given the sudden and largely

Awaiting the methodical, deliberate

Faced with a dearth of authority on
point, judges have frequently drawn
legal analogies between electronic
media and classic forms of evidence,
5
documents.
paper
as
such
Similarly, attorneys have found
themselves caught between clients'
desires to maintain the confidentiality of their e-mail communications
and lawyers' obligations to facilitate
the discovery of any potentially relevant material, including electronic
material. In addition, federal legislation governing the acquisition and
use of electronic communications has

a degree of certainty which was previously lacking. Attorneys should
advise their clients, both organizational and individual, that anything
which they commit to electronic mail
may be used against them in civil or
criminal proceedings, even if they
believe that they have deleted the
messages at issue. Corporations and
other organizations are well-advised
to encourage their personnel to use
the utmost prudence and caution in
what they write in electronic communications, because it may be the basis

then examine the special implications of attorney use of electronic
mail to communicate confidential
client information. Finally, it will
make recommendations concerning
how to counsel clients on matters of
e-mail policy and liability as well as
how attorneys may protect themselves from ethical violations resulting from e-mail use.

Electronic
Communication, the
!nternet, and the Wod
Vide Web

created novel interpretive issues.
Moreover, attorneys continue to face
the additional problem of whether

for potentially massive organizational liability. This advice may be all
the more pertinent and urgent in
view of the casual, careless manner

they themselves may communicate
confidential client information via email while still adhering to their ethical obligation to take reasonable
measures to ensure the confidentiali-

in which many users approach electronic mail and the common misconceptions as to whether it can be
obtained by hostile parties and
admitted as evidence. Furthermore,

by judges and attorneys, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of
the most common forms of electronic
communication. The use of electronic messaging systems within organi-

ty and security of that information.
As the courts have increasingly
considered questions involving the
discoverability and admissibility of e-

developments in federal statutory
law provide additional guideposts as
to under what circumstances e-mail
may by intercepted, accessed, or dis-

zations, for the most part, preceded
use among consumers. The earliest,

mail, a jurisprudence of electronic
communications has developed. This
body of case law leads to the
inevitable conclusion that, as a gen-

closed, and the ramifications of violations of these statutory restrictions.
This Note will explore the current
body of jurisprudence concerning the

eral proposition, electronic mail is
governed by the same rules and
framework as paper material.
Providing the backdrop for this position is an earlier body of jurispru-

discoverability and admissibility of email in both the civil and criminal
Beginning with a brief
contexts.

dence which has resolved that computerized business records are no different from paper records, both for
purposes of admission and protection. The courts have built upon this
foundation to keep the law current as
organizational and personal use of

explanation of the relevant forms of
information technology and electronic communication, it will examine the
common misconceptions that fuel the
ongoing imprudent use of e-mail. It
will then trace the development of
the case law, from the foundational
cases that first confronted electronic
evidence to recent precedent specifi-

computers has grown beyond databases and record-keeping to encompass
broad interpersonal communication.

cally addressing the various forms of
contemporary e-mail. Federal statutory law regulating the acquisition

Fortunately for attorneys and corporations, the case law now provides

and use of electronic communications
will also be discussed. This Note will
80

t

a order to fully understand both
confusion and difficulties faced

and still very common, type of these
systems involves a wholly internal
system which resides on an organization's mainframe computer or computer network. Traditionally used
for business and personal matters,
these messaging systems enable
employees to communicate with one
another electronically by sending
messages between desktop workstations in real time. These internal email systems often link multiple
facilities spanning disparate geographic locations using cables, telephone lines, or satellite links. Since
internal systems have existed for a
number of decades, a significant portion of the jurisprudence of electronic communication has developed
around these systems without specific reference to the Internet or World
Wide Web.
The Internet, in contrast, is an

external, public electronic communication structure that connects organizations and individuals throughout
the world. The Advanced Research
Projects Agency ("ARPA") of the
Department of Defense created the
Internet with a decentralized architecture consisting of multiple hosts
and communication routes, specifically designed to survive a nuclear
attack. 6 ARPA's goal was to create
an electronic pathway whereby scientists could share use of the
limited number of supercom-

Service Providers ("ISPs"). OSPs,
such as America Online ("AOL"), are
private commercial communication
networ ks within which subscribers
can coirrespond via electronic mail
among themselves, participate in
chat rc'oms, and access other subscriber- only content. ISPs are services vvhich provide access to the
Interne t and the World Wide Web,
and th rough which users can send
and rec:eive Internet e-mail. OSPs,

While

of information technology organizations, the Internet has
enjoyed phenomenal growth

su me that their messages

Today, the

Internet allows users throughout the world to communicate
by routing data between computers using standardized protocols. 8 E-mail is one of the
most common uses of the
Internet. 9
The World Wide
Web "is a global hypertext system that runs on the Internet"
enabling users to send and
receive textual, graphical,
video, and audio materials in
real time by use of interconnected
10

data files, or "hyperlinks."'
As the Internet has proliferated,
organizations have begun to employ
external e-mail, either by installing
Internet communication software
alongside their internal messaging
systems or by utilizing software that
combines both systems.
Hence,
employer-provided e-mail now frequently enables employees to communicate both with co-workers as
well as with the outside world.
The 1990s also witnessed the
rapid growth of both Online Service
Providers ("OSPs") and Internet

in at least one location. 11 Through
sophisticated detection and retrieval
tools, ostensibly deleted messages
remain subject to discovery and use
in litigation. 12 Most computer systems, whether in-house or ISPs, utilize some type of back-up on a regular basis. 13 Organizations typically
save all data on their mainframes or
client-server networks on a routine
basis, often daily. 14 Furthermore, when these back-ups are

puters in the late 1960s. 7 Now
administered by a consortium

during the 1990s.

permanently, virtually every deleted
electronic message continues to exist

many

users

pre-

are p rivate and entitled
to pr otection from the

eyes C)f the public or hostile liti gants .... There is at
most C)

reduced expecta-

tion c )f privacy for electronic messages, and

niyb e none at all.
in addi tion to providing private services, frequently also offer Internet
access tto their subscribers.
Comr mon

Misconceptions

of the legal confusion surroufidi g the discoverability and
admiss ibility of e-mail and electronic
records results from serious user
miscon ceptions. Two misconceptions
predom inate: the effect of deleting a
messag e and the expectation of privacy as to e-mail. While users often
presum .e that deleting a message on
their c omputer makes it disappear

performed, all data contained
in the computer system's files
during the relevant period is
generally captured, even messages that were sent, received,
and deleted within a short time
frame on the same day. This
back-up storage, which takes the
form of disks or tapes, is frequently preserved for long peri15
ods of time or even indefinitely.
Aside from the availability of
back-up materials, deletion by
a user does not erase a message
from the user's hard drive.
Rather, it only indicates that
the spot which the messages
occupies on the hard drive is
to be overwritten. 1 6
available
Utilizing specialized software, computer experts are frequently able to
find and retrieve purportedly deleted
messages on desktop hard drives
with relative ease. 1 7 Contrary to the
common perception, then, the act of
deleting electronic messages is merely a logistical command relating to a
computer's memory or disk space
rather than an actual erasure of a
message.
Overly confident of the
delete
command,
many
users
unknowingly leave an electronic trail.
Another common misunderstanding is the expectation of privacy with

respect to e-mail. 18 While many
users presume that their messages
are private and entitled to protection
from the eyes of the public or hostile
litigants, at least some courts have
held that there is at most a reduced
expectation of privacy for electronic
19
messages, and maybe none at all.
This limited expectation of privacy
inheres in all internal systems and
Internet e-mail and is not enhanced
by employer promises to the contrary. 20 Furthermore, this reduced
privacy level also applies to World
21
Wide Web chat rooms.
Falsely reassured by these critical
misconceptions, and lured by the
casual nature and ease of use of email, users can become complacent
and imprudent about the contents of
their communications. As one commentator observes, "Descriptions of
e-mail communication styles include
freewheeling, candid, unfiltered, not
modulated, raw and off the cuff. ....

[T]hese very attributes, which lend
themselves to easy, casual and seemingly efficient communication have
stung many companies and individuals whose transmissions have
returned to haunt them."2 2 Another
agrees:
commentator
e-mail
"[U]nlike paper memorandums [sic],
whose corporeal existence makes
people think twice about committing
questionable thoughts to paper, the
transitory nature of e-mail makes it
a perfect example of 'out of sight, out
23
of mind.'
As a result, judges often face hotly
contested disputes involving the discoverability and admissibility of
material in the electronic document
trail, information which in many
cases would never have been preserved were it not for the existence of
these technologies. Similarly, attorneys find themselves in difficult situ-

ations, trying to protect clients who
have carelessly exposed themselves
to potentially significant liability but
who, once those mistakes have been
made, find themselves duty-bound to
preserve and produce the potentially
24
damaging material.

Case Law Development
Discoverability
-ts

use has proliferated, elec-

tronic mail has led to a virtual treasure trove for attorneys seeking discovery of an adversary's internal and
external communications. 2 5 Studies
have revealed that 20 to 30 percent
of the data residing on computers is
26
never generated in hard copy form.
This statistic includes electronic
messages, as users often delete or
forward them without ever reducing
them to paper. As with many areas
of the law, technology has preceded
jurisprudence;
and
legislation
accordingly, courts first decided
questions of electronic mail discovery
on a largely ad hoc basis. 27 However,
as the number of cases in which this
technology plays a role has grown, a
body of law concerning e-mail has
developed, providing attorneys and
litigants with some degree of guidance. From electronic mail's earliest
days, in the absence of provisions in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
or other statutory law addressing
electronic material, the courts have
analogized it to paper documents for
purposes of discovery. 28 However,
because of the inherent differences between electronic and traditional media, novel questions
invariably arise which cannot
readily be answered by resorting
to existing doctrines.

What is Discoverable
n addressing the discoverability of
electronic material, courts often
begin with the premise that, as in the
case of paper, discovery rules are
In Daewoo
broad in scope. 29
30
Electronics Co. v. United States,
of
Court
States
United
the
International Trade examined a prethe
compelling
order
vious
Commerce
of
Department
("Commerce") to provide Zenith
Electronics Corporation ("Zenith")
with the raw data, in the form of
computer tapes, which Commerce
used in reaching a final decision in a
31
review of an anti-dumping order.
The court affirmed the general policy
that "information which is stored,
used, or transmitted in new forms
should be available through discovery with the same openness as traditional forms." 32 However, the court
further broadened the scope of discovery of electronic material by
ordering Commerce to also provide
Zenith with "the final refined forms
of the data on the original computer
tapes," translated into a format
usable by Zenith's computers, and
required that Commerce "[r]ender to
ZenithU . . . such cooperation and
reasonable assistance as is necessary
to enable them to process the computerized data." 33
The court based its holdings upon
two theories which have broad
applicability to discovery of electronic material. First, the court acknowledged the relative novelty of electronic technology and the difficulty of
ensuring that discovery orders precisely list all of the "further electronic refinements and embodiments of
taped" computer data. Accordingly,
the court required that parties comply with the spirit, rather than "the

most literal possible reading," of such
discovery orders. 3 4 Thus, an order
for 'computer tapes' . . . [was held to
cover] all forms of data which are
uniquely subject to manipulation by
Furthermore, the
computers." 3 5
court stated that the use of new
forms of technology should not serve
as a basis for avoiding compliance
with discovery orders simply because
of "excessive technical distinctions."
In fact, "[i]t would be a dangerous
development in the law if new techniques for easing the use of information become a hindrance to discovery
or disclosure in litigation." 3 6 The
court stated that application of the
broad principles of discovery which
have long governed non-electronic
material to computer data "is .

.

. in

consonance with Rule 34 of the
37
Federal Rules of Civil Procec ure."
Second, the court held that a discovery order may require a litigant to
perform a "normal and reasonable
translation of electronic data into a
form

usable

by

the

discovering

party[, absent] . . . a showing of

Along
extraordinary hardship." 38
with this, the responding party must
also provide the requesting party
with "a normal and reasonable
degree of direct communication and
assistance," within the same hardship
limitation. 39 Both of these, the court
concluded, are "the ordinary and fore'40
seeable burden of a respondent.

("CIBA"), the class
plaintiffs sought
discovery of internal electronic mail
"generated
and
within
stored
CIBA's computer
s y s t e m. "4 2
Producing
requested

the
mes-

would
sages
require creating a
"retrieval
program"

which

would be used to
search some 30
million pages of
electronic correthen
spondence
stored on back-up
tapes. 43 The data
retrieval program
would be required
"to search the efor
mail data
names of particular

individuals

and to eliminate
duplicate
messages," at an estimated cost of
between $50,000
and $70,000. 44 As
a
preliminary
matter, it is noteworthy that CIBA
did not object to
the discoverability

Balancing Benefits and Burdens
n In Re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 4 1 the
United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois built
upon the principles established in
Daewoo. In this class action litigation
against, among other corporate defenCorporation
dants,
CIBA-Geigy

of this electronic
mail, and the
expressly
court
affirmed the principle that "computer-stored information is discoverable under the
same rules that
pertain to tangi-

45

ble, written materials."
However, a dispute arose as to
whether the class plaintiffs or CIBA
should bear the costs of creating the
data retrieval program and carrying
out the search. The court resolved
this question by using a balancing
test. First, it stated the threshold
principle that "the mere fact that the
production of computerized data will
result in a substantial expense is not
a sufficient justification for imposing
the costs of production on the
requesting party."4 6 In addition, the
court stated, it should consider
"whether the relative expense and
burden in obtaining the data would
be greater to the requesting party as
compared to the responding party,
and whether the responding party
will benefit to some degree in producing the data in question." 4 7 While
acknowledging that complying with
this discovery request was "expensive," the court nevertheless held
48
that CIBA should bear the cost.
Key to the court's decision was that
CIBA not only chose to utilize an
electronic storage system, but also
that it selected the specific software
and tape back-up systems which it
employed. Since "part of the burden
attendant to searching its storage
files results from 'the limitations of
the software' which CIBA used, the
court considered it unfair to impose
these costs on the class plaintiffs,
who had no control over what data
49
storage system CIBA used.
Another case that utilized a similar balancing approach reached a
contrary result. In Fennell v. First
Step Designs. Ltd., 50 the United
States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed a district court holding that prohibited discovery of a
defendant's computer hard drive.
The plaintiff, alleging retaliatory dis-

charge for filing a sexual harassment
claim, sought discovery of the defendant's hard drive in order to determine whether a memo slating her for
layoff was actually written on the
date claimed by the defendant. As
the appellate court formulated the
balancing test, "the district court...
balanced the costs, burdens, and
delays that the proposed discovery
entailed, as well as the likelihood of
discovering [useful] evidence[,] ...
against the obvious importance of
'5 1
the evidence sought."
In order to analyze the hard drive,
the plaintiffs computer experts
would have to create a "mirror" copy
of the entire hard drive, which then
would be examined at the experts'
facilities. 52 The district court determined that such a procedure
involved significant costs and risks.
The costs would involve the necessary down time which the defendant
would have to endure while the mirroring occurred. 53 Risks consisted of
the difficulties in protecting other
information on the hard drive, such
as work product relating to the litigation and privileged attorney-client
Furthermore,
communications. 54
that the
concerned
was
the court
mirroring process might adversely
affect the defendant's computer system, warning that "[t]he lack of
detail in Fennell's . . . [proposed
method of mirroring and analyzing
the hard drive] cast[s] . . . doubt on
the soundness of the technical basis
venture. '5 5
discovery
the
for
Accordingly, the district court concluded, and the First Circuit
affirmed, that the numerous and
substantial risks and the significant
costs of the plaintiffs proposed discovery of the hard drive outweighed
Therefore,
the potential benefits.
discovery was denied. 56

In these noteworthy electronic discovery cases, the courts have promulgated this balancing approach in
discovery
whether
determining
should
who
and
should be permitted
pay. Ultimately, the discoverability
of electronic material tends to be "ad
hoc and fact-specific." 57 Nevertheless, Brand Name Prescription Drugs
and Daewoo make clear that, should
computer material be deemed discoverable, a responding party's obligation may not be satisfied by merely
turning over raw data or files in the
format used by the responding party.
Organizations with large amounts of
stored electronic material may be
obliged to create retrieval software at
their own expense, perform searches
and compile the results, transform
the data into a format readable by
the requesting party's computers,
and provide a reasonable degree of
technical assistance to facilitate the
requesting party's access to the information, all at its own cost. 5 8
Therefore, organizations would be
well-advised to consider these potentially high costs and significant obligations not only with respect to formulating e-mail policy but also when
making strategic decisions as to
what types of electronic data storage
and retrieval systems to invest in
and utilize. Technology should be
easily adaptable once litigation has
begun and discovery orders have
been issued. Wise technology decisions may make compliance with discovery smooth and affordable; poor
strategic planning can make it onerous and expensive.

Admissibility of Electronic
Communications and
Records
he foundation for the admissibili-

ty of electronic mail was laid by cases
that addressed computerized busi59

ness records.
Long before e-mail
came into common use, organizations
began using computers to store and
compile business data, such as
accounting and transactional information. As computers came into
widespread use in organizational
environments, the key question facing a number of courts was whether
there was any qualitative difference,
for evidentiary purposes, between
computerized business records and

("FBRA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a), 64
which "establishes the admissibility
in federal courts of any writing or
record, made as a memorandum or
record of an act or transaction, as
evidence of such act or transaction if
made in the ordinary course of busi65

ness."
The court stated that the
FBRA "does not require that, to be
admissible, the record must be in
writing."6 6 Moreover, the court concluded that the same protections
exist with respect to electronic
records as exist for paper documenta-

data recorded on paper. The
answer to this question would
provide the basis for determin-

[O]rganizations would be
well-advised to consider
these potentially high costs

In the 1969 case of United

and significant obligations

States v. De Georgia, 60 a defendant appealed his conviction of
interstate transportation of a
stolen automobile owned by the
Hertz Corporation ("Hertz").
In establishing that the vehicle
was stolen, the prosecution
relied on information from a
Hertz computer system which
indicated that the car was not
rented or leased to anyone during the time when, according to the
defendant, he had only borrowed it
from a friend who was supposedly
leasing it from Hertz. 6 1 Hertz used
this computer system to maintain all
of its automobile rental and lease
information in lieu of any paper
record-keeping system. 62 The court
held that "it is immaterial that ...[a]

business record is maintained in a
computer rather than in company
books."'63 The Ninth Circuit addressed
the admissibility of business information under the relevant portion of the
Records

challenged the admission of a 1967
computer compilation of statistical
data used to obtain his conviction of
mail fraud for falsely obtaining payments from Blue Shield of Michigan.
Echoing De Georgia, the court held
that the FBRA, though it does not
expressly address electronic data,

which businesses today depend

apply equally to paper and electronic material.

Business

v. Russo, 6 8 the Sixth Circuit followed
this analysis. In Russo, a physician

necessarily includes such material. 6 9 Noting "the extent to

ing whether the traditional
rules of admissibility would

Federal

data would be treated as indistinguishable from written material for
evidentiary purposes.
Four years later, in United States

Act

on computers for a myriad of
functions," the court stated
that the FBRA "should never
be interpreted so strictly as to
deprive the courts of the realities of business and profession-

...when making strategic

al practices." 70 Thus, not only
was electronic data regarded as

decisions as to what types
of electronic data storage
and retrieval systems to

the evidentiary equivalent of
paper material, but the court

invest in and utilize.
tion. These protections include the

also followed a policy of adapting admissibility rules to track
modern business practice.

By

this view, information generated through the use of highly
efficient innovations should not
be rendered inadmissible simply

preliminary requirement that the
prosecution lay a sufficient foundation for the trustworthiness of the
evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence ("FRE") § 104(b) and that

because of differences between the
new technology and more traditional
record-keeping. 7 1
of
modes

"the opposing party is given the same
opportunity to inquire into the accuracy of the computer and the input

firmed the admissibility of computer72
ized business information.

procedures used, as he would have to
inquire into the accuracy of written
business records. '6 7 Accordingly, in
addressing computerized business
records, the court promulgated the
far-reaching principle that computer

Consistent with this line of reasoning, various other circuits have con-

In recent years, several significant
cases have squarely addressed the
admissibility of electronic mail. One
such case of note was Strauss v.
Microsoft Corp., 73 a sexual discrimination suit in which the plaintiff
sought to admit e-mail messages that

were both profoundly embarrassing
to
damaging
potentially
and
Microsoft. Through discovery, the
plaintiff obtained electronic mail in
which her supervisor dubbed himself
the "president of the Amateur
Gynecology Club" and referred to
another female employee as the
"Spandex Queen." 7 4 Additionally,
the supervisor sent messages to
other staff members which respectively contained a news report on a
proposal to institute a "sex holiday"
in Finland and "a parody of a play
entitled 'A Girl's Guide to Condoms."'
The latter message ultimately was
75
forwarded to the plaintiff.
Microsoft objected to the
admission of this material on
the bases of relevance under
FRE § 401 and prejudice under
FRE § 403.76 Ultimately overruling Microsoft's objections,
the court analyzed each in light
of long-standing American
jurisprudence on these two evidentiary provisions, without
making any special distinction
or modifying the analysis
because the messages were in
electronic form. 77 In so doing,
the court treated electronic
material as indistinguishable
from other forms of evidence, at
least with respect to basic admissibility questions of relevance and
prejudice. Accordingly, this noteworthy case, decided in the midst of the
Internet revolution, held that e-mail
is both discoverable and admissible
in civil cases, indicating that courts
will generally analyze e-mail under
the same rules and framework as
paper and other non-electronic
communications.
The criminal context presents similar developments. In United States
v. Maxwell, 7 8 one of the broadest and

most far-reaching opinions relating
to e-mail, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces categorically analyzed the level of expectation of privacy, if any, to which a
party is entitled with respect to three
of the most popular types of electronic mail. 79 In Maxwell, the defendant
challenged his conviction of knowingly transporting child pornography
and other obscene material in interstate commerce through the use of
his computer. The defendant contended that, among other things, the
seizure and admission of e-mail messages transmitted via AOL violated

[W]hereas traditional discoverability and admissibility rules are only trig-

gered during the course
of litigation, the

ECPA

applies to disclosure of
electronic

communica-

tions in all situations.

his Fourth Amendment expectation
of privacy. 80
The court analogized electronic
communications to its more traditional counterparts, postal mail and
telephone. 8 1 Citing long established
case law, the court explained that a
sender of a sealed letter in the mails
has a reasonable expectation that the

vacy disappears "absent some legal
privilege."8 3 "Similarly, [while] the
maker of a telephone call has a reasonable expectation that police officials will not intercept and listen to
the conversation[,] . . .the conversation itself is held with the risk that
one of the participants may reveal
what is said to others."8 4
The court first applied these doctrines to e-mail among users of a
common, private electronic communications service such as AOL. The
court held that "the transmitter of an
e-mail message enjoys a reasonable
expectation that police officials will
not intercept the transmission
without probable cause and a
search warrant" from the time
that the message is sent until
the moment it is received and
"open[ed]" by the recipient.8 5
However, once the message is
viewed, the recipient is then
free to forward it on to others
or to share its contents, even
with law enforcement authorities, as may the recipient of
postal correspondence or the
other party to a telephone conversation.8 6 Thus, the expectation of privacy present upon
the initial transmission of the
electronic message is substantially reduced or, for practical purposes, effectively disappears once it
is received and opened. 87 Moreover,
the court stated that this framework
is not changed by the risk that a
"hacker" or an AOL employee, contrary to company policy, might intercept or read private messages. 88
While such actions may be illegal or

contents of the letter will remain private (absent probable cause and a
82
search warrant) during transit.

violative of contractual obligations,
"this is not the same as the police
commanding an individual to inter-

However, "once the letter is received
and opened," any expectation of pri-

cept the message." 8 9
The court also distinguished mes-

86

sages sent within private, self-contained electronic mail services such
as AOL from e-mail sent via the
Internet. The former enjoy a greater,

95
ed reasonable expectation of privacy.

plaintiff/employee,

The court determined the bounds of
this expectation in the varied forms

employer assurances that messages
sent on the company's e-mail system
would be "confidential and privileged" and would "not be intercepted

relying

on

albeit still reduced, expectation of
privacy than the latter. 90 In the case

of e-mail through the foundational
concept that "[e]xpectations of privacy in e-mail transmissions depend in

of AOL, the messages "are privately
stored for retrieval on AOL's central-

large part on the type of e-mail
'96
involved and the intended recipient.

as grounds for termination or reprimand," made inflammatory state-

ized and privately-owned computer
bank" and "AOL's policy was not to

A more recent district court case
has followed this reasoning.
In

ments about sales management in email communications with his super-

read or disclose subscribers' e-mail to
anyone except authorized users, thus
offering its own contractual privacy
protection in addition to any federal
statutory [or constitutional] protec-

United States v. Charbonneau, 9 7 a
defendant charged with transporta-

visor. 10 4

91

tions."
The Internet, on the other
hand, "has a less secure e-mail system, in which messages must pass
through a series of computers in
order to reach the intended recipient. '9 2
Thus, while a sender of
Internet e-mail may enjoy some limited expectation of privacy, that
expectation is necessarily lower than
within a private commercial service
such as AOL due to the absence of a
contractual privacy provision.
Finally, the court contrasted
ostensibly
private
messages,
whether transmitted within a private online service or via the
Internet, with chat rooms. The court
reasoned that "the more open the
method of transmission, such as the
'chat room,' the less privacy one can
reasonably expect. '9 3 The court concluded that chat rooms, like e-mail
messages which are forwarded many
times, are "[m]essages sent to the
public at large" and therefore "lose
any semblance of privacy." 94 In sum,
the Maxwell court established the
far-reaching principle that the
jurisprudence of electronic communications parallels that of more traditional forms of communication.
Consequently, some forms of electronic mail possess only a very limit-

tion and possession of child pornography sought to suppress evidence of
incriminating chat room transmissions
on
Fourth
Amendment
98
grounds.
Provided through AOL,
these chat rooms were arguably pri-

and used ...

against ...

employees

Despite these assurances,
the defendant/employer intercepted
these e-mails and discharged the
plaintiff because of their "inappropri10 5
ate and unprofessional" contents.
The court dismissed the plaintiffs
wrongful discharge claim, holding
that there is no "reasonable expecta-

vate in the sense that they were
''maintained by private users" and
''contained many users interested in

tion of privacy in e-mail communica-

trading graphic files with pictures of
child pornography." 9 9 The court, following Maxwell, held that e-mail

standing any assurances that such

generally

tion, the court stated that even if a
reasonable expectation of privacy
were found to exist, private employee

parallels

letters

sent

through the mails with respect to privacy expectation and that, despite
the ostensibly private aspects of chat
rooms, "the openness of the 'chat
room' [further] diminishes ...[one's]

reasonable expectation of privacy." 10 0 Moreover, analogizing online
chat rooms to oral conversations susceptible to eavesdropping, the court
held that users of chat rooms have no
Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy with respect to undercover
agents who might be logged on at any
time. 10 1
As the district court
explained, this is a risk that all users

tions voluntarily made .

.

. over ...

[a] company e-mail system notwithcommunications would not be intercepted by management." 10 6 In addi-

e-mail would still be afforded no protection because a company's interest
in preventing the use of its e-mail
system for "inappropriate and unprofessional comments or even illegal
activity . . . outweighs any privacy

interest the employee may have in
those comments." 10 7 While Smvth
did not directly involve questions of
adversarial discovery or admissibility in a legal proceeding, it removed
any doubt that no reasonable expectation of privacy inheres in employ-

of chat rooms undertake in view of
1 02
their public nature.

ee e-mail.
Hence, with little and consistently

Another district court has held
even more starkly that certain e-mail
communications are simply unpro10 3
tected. Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.
involved the interception and inspection of private employee e-mail. The

lagging statutory guidance as to the
admissibility of electronic evidence,
judges have applied long-standing
legal doctrines-originally developed
for traditional forms of data and communication-to electronic material

unimaginable when these traditional
doctrines came into being. As illustrated by cases such as Strauss,
Maxwell, Charbonneau, and Smyth,
this jurisprudence continues to be

material in traditional form likewise
material.
electronic
for
exist
Maxwell
as
such
cases
Furthermore,
and Charbonneau set out useful distinctions between the various forms

ty.1 12 First, the ECPA specifically
regulates electronic communications. 113 It creates both civil (private
and governmental) and criminal
causes of action for the unauthorized

refined and adapted to new developments in technology. The analogy
between non-electronic material and
its electronic counterparts is necessarily becoming more complex as

of e-mail and Web communications
now widely in use, and the extent to
which key legal doctrines apply to
each. These cases are among the

interception, accessing, and disclosure of e-mail. 1 14 Second, whereas
and
discoverability
traditional

becomes
communication
increasingly nuanced. However, parallels continue to be drawn and
applied. Generally, in both civil and
criminal cases, electronic material is

main legal guideposts available today.

admissibility rules are only triggered
during the course of litigation, the
ECPA applies to disclosure of elec-

The Electronic
Communications
Privacy Act

tronic communications in all situations.1 15 Therefore, it is important
to understand how the ECPA affects

itle III of the Omnibus Crime
C-trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968

the maintenance and disclosure of
electronic communications even
absent pending litigation.
Title I of the ECPA regulates the

online

admissible if it satisfies the conditions requisite for the admission of
equivalent material in non-electronic
form. This applies equally to business and personal messages, including internal and external e-mail and
Web chat room communications.
Any statutory or constitutional limitations or privileges which exist for

("Omnibus Act") created national standards for governmental and private
electronic surveillance of wire and oral
conversations. 108 As time passed, the
Omnibus Act's definitions failed to
address technological advances in communication. 10 91n re-sponse, Con-gress
the
amended
Omnibus Act with
the

Electronic

eCom-munications
t1986
nregulate
S

tt.......

.

Privacy Act of
("ECPA") to
the surveillance of electronic communications, including email. 11

This

reamendment
flected the increasingly "pervaSItsive"

intentional interception of wire, oral,
11 6
and electronic communications.
scope of communications
The
1 17
addressed by the ECPA is broad,
and likewise, the definition of "intercept" is broadly worded.1 1 8 Title I,
however, regulates only intentional
actions and thereby raises the inherent difficulties of proving an alleged
violator's subjective intent. Further,
even under Title I, government
agents may still intentionally intercept e-mail so long as they obtain a
court order that strictly complies
with requirements as to "minimization, duration, and the types of
crimes that may be investigated."1 1 9
Therefore, so long as the government
makes a specific showing for the
information it is seeking, it may

role of computers in "the
business and home

obtain the material in spite of Title I.
In addition, case law has limited
Title I's scope to the "acquisition of

environments."11 1

the contents of ... communications ..
. contemporaneous with their transmission," 12 0 effectively constraining
the statute's broad definition of

The ECPA differs in application
from the common
law jurisprudence
of discoverability
and admissibili-

"intercept." Therefore, the statute
and limited case law greatly restrict
the breadth of this title.

In contrast to contemporaneous
acquisitions, Title II of the ECPA
regulates, inter alia, "whoever . . .
intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an
electronic communication service is
provided . . . and thereby obtains,
alters, or prevents authorized access
to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage. .
• *"121 Also under Title II, the government's ability to reach stored email is limited by the statute's
requirement that a warrant (within
180 days of storage or after 180 days
but without required notice), subpoena or court order (outside 180 days
with the required notice) 122 issue to
reach the stored communications.
With respect to court orders, Title II
provides that an order shall issue
only if the government "offers specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds that
the contents of a[n] . . . electronic
communication ... are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal
investigation."

1 23

While the jurisprudence of the
Omnibus Act interpreted "intercept"
to only apply to the acquisition of
communications in transit, 1 24 e-mail
posed a unique difficulty. Unlike
telephone and oral communications,
there is often a significant time delay
between the moment an e-mail message is sent and when it is opened
and read by the recipient. During
this period, the e-mail service
provider (ISP, OSP, or other
provider) typically stores the messages. Thus, the question becomes
whether Title I or Title II covers
unopened, yet stored messages.
In the seminal case applying the
ECPA, Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v.
United States Secret Service, the
Fifth Circuit addressed whether the

unauthorized seizure of e-mail messages that have been transmitted but
not yet opened by the recipient constitutes a Title I interception or a
Title II accessing of stored messages. 125 In Steve Jackson Games,
the United States Secret Service
("Secret Service") seized a computer
operated by an electronic bulletin
board service. At the time of seizure,
the computer contained 162 e-mail
messages that had not yet been
retrieved; Secret Service staff then
read these messages. 12 6 The appellants argued that the messages in
question were "intercepted" because
the government's actions acquired
the messages prior to delivery and, in
12 7
fact, prevented their delivery.
The court, however, held that the
inclusion of e-mail within the scope
of the ECPA did not change the longstanding requirement of contemporaneous action for an "interception"
under the Omnibus Act. 12 8 Because
the e-mails were stored on the seized
computer and were not in transit, the
court held that they were stored
rather than intercepted for purposes
129
of the ECPA.
The Fifth Circuit's e-mail analysis
under Title I and Title II has potentially very broad effects. First, the
case sets the precedent for extending
traditional temporal notions of interception to technologies that may
incorporate significant time delays
before receipt of communications.
Second, the government's procedural
requirements for intercepting electronic messages require a more particularized showing than for the
accessing of stored communications.130 Therefore, holding that disclosure of unretrieved messages falls
under Title II permits governmental
access to most e-mail under "more
lenient ...standards [than those] for

governmental access to intercepted
• . . communications," such as data
streams and telephone conversations. 13 1 As a result, e-mail is effectively afforded less protection from
government interference than many
other types of communication regu13 2
lated by the ECPA.
Aside from the interception issue,
government access to stored information from service providers has
raised a number of noteworthy
issues. McVeigh v. Cohen addressed
whether a government agency's duty
to obtain a warrant, subpoena, or
court order to access stored electronic communications service records is
violated when a service provider voluntarily discloses the information to
an unidentified member of that governmental agency. 13 3 The case also
addressed whether the duty of
nondisclosure is on the service
This case involved a
provider. 13 4
United States Navy investigation
into whether the plaintiff had made
homosexual statements online in violation of "the statutory policy colloquially known as 'Don't Ask, Don't
Tell, Don't Pursue."' 1 35 A naval legal
employee contacted AOL and, without identifying himself or possessing
a warrant, subpoena, or court order,
requested and received the identity
of an AOL subscriber. 136 The United
States District Court for the District
of Columbia interpreted Title II,
Section 2703(c)(1)(A) as establishing
reciprocal requirements on both the
government
provider.137

the
service
Without the informaand

tion obtained through violation of the
ECPA, the naval discharge proceedings against the plaintiff could never
have been brought; therefore, the
court granted a preliminary injunction against discharge. 13 8
On

the

other

hand,

Jessup-

Morgan v. America Online, Inc.
addressed
whether
a
service
provider's disclosure of a subscriber's

Furthermore, this analysis may indicate the availability of a cause of action
seeking damages for the intrusion.

identity to a private party violated
Section 2702 of the ECPA. 1 39 In this
case, the plaintiff ("Morgan") posted
a message to a bulletin board inviting members of the board to call a
woman ("Smith") concerning her
desire to have sex. 1 40
Smith
obtained Morgan's identity pursuant
14 1
to a subpoena served on AOL.
Among other claims, Morgan challenged the validity of the subpoena
and claimed that AOL's disclosure
violated the ECPA. 142 Section 2702
"prohibits disclosure of the contents
of an electronic communication to
any person or entity or to the government without first meeting certain
restrictions." 14 3 In reviewing the
information disclosed by AOL, the
court determined that the "contents"
of a communication 'includes any
information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication,' not information concerning the identity of the author of
the communication." 144 Therefore,
independent of the contents of a communication, a service provider can
disclose the identity of an author to a
private party without liability under
the ECPA.
Hence, while the ECPA applies to
a wide range of electronic material,
any acquisition that does not fall

Attorneys, Confidential
Client Information,
and E-Mail

common types of e-mail to other
media and analogized the expectations of privacy for each with what
the Committee believed to be their
traditional counterparts. First, the

(!-mail presents serious risks

Committee addressed "direct e-mail,"
whereby a lawyer and a client or
other third party exchange information by a direct modem connec-

t, i
s, it also carries unique dangers for attorneys. In addition to

tion. 14 8 Not e-mail in the everyday
sense, such messages are transmit-

advising business and individual
clients as to the risks inherent in email, attorneys also face the poten-

ted digitally through land-line tele-

tially more vexing problem of
whether to use e-mail themselves to
communicate confidential client
information. While advice to clients

phone wires in the same way as facsimiles. Both because no third party
routers are involved in the exchange
of information as well as because of
the technical sophistication required
to tap and decipher a digital data

on e-mail policies seeks to minimize
potential liability, the propriety of
communicating confidential clientrelated material through electronic
mail involves issues even closer to
home for attorneys.
Incorrect

stream, the Committee determined
that direct e-mail carries a reason-

appraisal of a lawyer's duty to take
reasonable steps to prevent the

intra-organizational system connecting employees at a single site or at

unauthorized disclosure of confiden-

multiple sites by land-based telephone lines. The Committee con-

tial client information can lead to a
145
violation of disciplinary rules.
The American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional
Responsibility
("Committee") recently promulgated
a Formal Opinion addressing the
confidentiality
of
unencrypted
Internet e-mail and the ethical oblig-

able expectation of privacy with
respect to confidential information. 14 9 Similar to direct e-mail is
"private system e-mail," typically an

cluded that private system e-mail
carries the same reasonable expectation of privacy as direct e-mail for the
1 50
same reasons.
The Committee then addressed
two types of electronic mail that fall
more

within

the

contemporary

ations of attorneys with respect to
the transmission of confidential

understanding of e-mail: e-mail provided by OSPs, such as AOL and
CompuServe, and Internet e-mail.151

client information via unencrypted email.146 The Committee concluded

OSP e-mail was deemed to entail a
reasonable expectation of privacy

that unencrypted e-mail involves a
reasonable expectation of privacy
and, therefore, an attorney does not

despite three inherent concerns: the
risks of misdirection of messages to
other service users, of external

This conclusion is critical in

violate his or her duty under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct

determining whether to invoke a
statutory and/or common law argu-

by sending confidential client infor14 7
mation by this mode.

access to user e-mail boxes, and of
potential interception and inspection
15 2
of messages by service providers.

ment for excluding the material.

The Committee compared four

within the narrow statutory language lies outside the ECPA's coverage and common law doctrine
applies. In proceedings in which the
admissibility of e-mail is contested,
attorneys should assess whether the
ECPA applies to the particular situation.

9fl

The Committee found the risk of misdirection to be equivalent to a similar

risk inherent in faxes. 153 The dangers of external access and OSP
inspection, the Committee believed,
are mitigated by password and
encryption protection and by federal
limitations on OSPs' ability to
inspect messages. 1 54 However, the
that,
acknowledged
Committee
in a
message
a
misdirected
unlike
direct or private system environment, a recipient of a misdirected
OSP e-mail message has no duty of
15 5
confidentiality and nondisclosure.
Finally, the Committee concluded
that attorneys also enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy when
using unencrypted Internet email. 15 6 This type of e-mail is
the most commonly understood
variety today: e-mail sent
between users via the Internet
rather than through propriUnetary OSP systems.
encrypted Internet e-mail necessarily involves greater risks
of interception and disclosure
than any of the other forms,
since it is transmitted across a
quasi-public network and is

liability and because of the supposed
fragmentation of individual messages
sent via the Internet. 160 The danger

ly separated into segments or fragments during transmission, thus
reducing the possibility of intercep-

of propagation by viruses, the
Committee believed, could be eliminated by an updated anti-virus softHence, the
ware application. 16 1
Committee concluded that unencrypt-

tion by intermediate ISPs, complete
copies of messages may be handled
by providers or carriers on each end
of a transmission. 16 3 These handlers
increase the risk of interception.

ed Internet e-mail carries a reasonable expectation of privacy, and that
attorneys may properly use it to com162
municate client-related material.

the
although
Similarly,
Committee considered legal prohibitions on hacking to be a viable means
of protection, the open architecture of
the Internet serves as an invitation

This conclusion, however, is highthe
First,
ly questionable.
Committee underestimates the magnitude of the risk of interception not

Perhaps the most difficult challenge may be
dispelling the commonly
held and dangerous
misconceptions, which
lull

users into a false

sense of privacy.

directed and routed by a num1 57
ber of ISPs while in transit.
Moreover, the non-proprietary, open
nature of the Internet renders it particularly vulnerable to hackers seeking to intercept messages. In addition, Internet e-mail is also susceptible to computer viruses, "some of
which have the capability of causing
the user's document to be propagated
As
to unintended recipients."' 1 58
with OSP e-mail, the Committee considered the risk of interception by
ISPs, although permitted in certain
to be rendered
circumstances,
insignificant by the legal limitations
on this practice. 15 9 It dismissed the
risk of hackers because of criminal
prohibitions and the potential for civil

only by ISPs but also by hackers.
The public nature of the Internet and
the land-based telephone lines over
which messages travel render
Internet e-mail particularly vulnerable to third party interception. While
the Committee found the legal limitations regulating under what circumstances ISPs can intercept and
read messages sufficient to ensure
the security of Internet e-mail, the
unique position of ISPs, both as hosts
and routers, provides them and their
employees with especially easy
access to Internet e-mail. While the
Committee correctly recognized that
Internet e-mail messages are typical-

for hackers to ply their skill. Indeed,
the proliferation of illegal computer
hacking in a variety of environments
reveals that the mere existence
of legal prohibitions will not
deter unauthorized access to
private information.
Furthermore,

the

Committee's reasoning does not
take account of noteworthy case
law to the contrary. Maxwell,
Charbonneau, and Smyth clearly held that various types of email carry little to no reason164
able expectation of privacy.
The Committee's statement
that "an expectation of privacy.
• . [in unencrypted Internet email] is reasonable" runs directly contrary to this precedent. 165
the
in
weakness
Another
Committee's reasoning is its failure
to recognize the significance of backup systems. Nearly all electronic
messages are saved through some
type of back-up media, often for long
periods of time. 16 6 Thus, not only
does an attorney run the almost-certain risk that ostensibly deleted messages continue to exist in some form,
but the ongoing existence of e-mails
containing confidential information
creates the consequential danger of
unauthorized access and disclosure.
Moreover, even the Committee itself

acknowledged that a number of state
bar ethics opinions continue to recommend that lawyers either secure
client permission before using unencrypted Internet e-mail to communicate confidential information or
refrain from its use altogether.167
NAVIGATING THE UNCERTAIN
LANDSCAPE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS
Ip rrently unanticipated forms of
dect?,nic communication develop,
attorneys may be best advised to follow the processes set out in these and

neys are well-advised to make their
clients, both individuals and organizations, aware that most anything
which they communicate via computer may be traced, recovered, and
used against them in civil or criminal
proceedings, subject only to the same
protections which apply to paper
material. Hence, it is best to advise
clients to exercise caution and to
refrain from "put[ting] anything in email [or on the World Wide Web] that
• . . [they] wouldn't want a jury to

similar cases. Prudence suggests a
meticulous analysis of the nature of

see[] or want published on the front
1 68
page of . . . [their] newspaper."
Corporations and other organizations should establish clear guidelines as to what constitutes inappro-

the new communication technology
relative to both currently established

priate content for electronic communications, informing employees that

forms of electronic messaging as well

their use of electronic mail at work
may subject both them and their
employers to liability. Caution, care,
and prudence appear to be the best
guidelines with respect to e-mail.
Attorneys should also fully under-

as to doctrines applicable to traditional forms of communication. This
task has been made significantly easier since the foundational principle
has now been laid: Electronic evidence is qualitatively no different
from non-electronic evidence. While
there is no strictly legal difference,
the significance of the former lies in
what it might reveal: workplace gossip, liability-incurring offensiveness,
and criminal activities. All of these
are communications that users may
assume to be erasable and unrecoverable. But they clearly may be recovered, may be the subject of legitimate
discovery, and may be admissible.
For attorneys and organizations,
the careless communication engendered by e-mail, combined with its
longevity and ease of retrievability,
renders it worthy of urgent attention. Perhaps the most difficult challenge may be dispelling the commonly held and dangerous misconceptions, which lull users into a false
sense of privacy. In any event, attor-

stand the additional restrictions and
remedies created by the ECPA.
Although narrow in scope, this
statute may provide clients with a
means of preventing the admission of
evidence procured in violation of its
terms in civil and criminal proceedings. Moreover, it may also enable
clients to attain relief when material
is illegally obtained outside of the
discovery framework.
Attorneys themselves face their
own risks in how they choose to communicate with clients and transmit
confidential
client
information.
While the Committee may have provided some guidance, its conclusions
rest on an uncertain foundation and
run contrary to some legal precedent.
Attorneys should constantly bear in
mind the unique dangers to which
Internet communications are vulner92

able.

Even forms of e-mail which
have clear non-digital parallels may
be more risky than their traditional
analogues because the very nature of
the Internet magnifies many dangers. In addition, the lack of unanimity among state bar ethics panels
plainly shows how the question of the
relative security of e-mail remains
uncertain. 169 This alone strongly
counsels extra caution on the part of
lawyers.
Furthermore, while the
Committee's findings may lend some
credibility to a reasonable expectation of privacy argument, an attorney cannot ignore the existing contrary case law.
All of these considerations demonstrate that, if attorneys choose to use
e-mail to communicate confidential
client information, they should consider the use of encryption technology or, at a minimum, discuss the
dangers of unencrypted Internet email with individual clients to determine their acceptable level of risk.
By obtaining informed, knowledgeable permission from clients before
using unencrypted e-mail for these
purposes, attorneys can both provide
the communication convenience and
efficiency so important to many
clients today while at the same time
avoiding the ethical uncertainty and
risk otherwise inherent in the use of
unencrypted Internet e-mail.
For both clients and attorneys, email can be a minefield of legal liability and ethical danger. Latent,
forgotten messages can suddenly
arise from the "deleted" file as the
smoking gun of damaging evidence.
By understanding the discoverability
and admissibility of e-mail, and by
grasping the technology that underlies it, attorneys can disarm such
landmines long before they become
legal and ethical hazards.
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